Abstract
In survey research, a consensus has grown regarding the effectiveness of incentives encouraging survey participation across different survey modes and target populations. Most of this research has been based on surveys from the United States, whereas few studies have provided evidence that these results can be generalized to other contexts. This paper is the first to present comprehensive information concerning the effects of incentives on response rates and nonresponse bias across large-scale surveys in Germany. The context could be viewed as a critical test for incentive effects because Germany's population is among the most survey-critical in the world, with very low response rates. Our results suggest positive incentive effects on response rates and patterns of effects that are similar to those in previous research: The effect increased with the monetary value of the incentive; cash incentives affected response propensity more strongly than lottery tickets do; and prepaid incentives could be more cost effective than conditional incentives. We found mixed results for the effects of incentives on nonresponse bias. Regarding large-scale panel surveys, we could not unequivocally confirm that incentives increased response rates in later panel waves.
nonresponse is not at random (Rubin 1976) . Even when nonresponse is not selective, increasing the sample size as a direct countermeasure incurs higher costs. To increase survey response, several methods have been developed, such as advance letters, special contacting procedures, interviewer training, and various forms of incentives (Groves and Couper 1998; Groves et al. 2009; Schoeni et al. 2013) .
This paper contributes to the existing research regarding incentive effects on government-sponsored, large-scale, face-to-face surveys by providing the first comprehensive overview of incentive experiments conducted on surveys in Germany. We focus on face-to-face surveys because they tend to be the primary mode of data collection for large-scale social surveys in the United States and Europe. The current literature indicates ample evidence concerning incentive effects in large-scale, face-to-face-surveys (see Singer [2002] and Singer and Ye [2013] for reviews). However, on closer consideration, the amount of evidence for these surveys is limited. Even Singer (2002, 176) qualified the generalizability of her results: "many of the findings are based on one or a few experiments… [and] a great deal of specification and replication is needed." This deficiency has not improved much since then, and Singer and Ye (2013, 135) found "only one post-2002 report of an incentive experiment carried out in a cross-sectional face-to-face study."
The question of the cross-national transferability of incentive effects has been raised before in the literature (e.g., Singer et al. 1999; Couper and de Leeuw 2003; Blom, Jäckle, and Lynn 2010) . From a theoretical perspective, incentive effects could depend on cultural and socio-demographic circumstances, as different degrees of resistance to surveys must be overcome through other fieldwork efforts (e.g., Johnson et al. 2002; Cantor, O'Hare, and O'Connor 2008) . There is also empirical evidence for cross-national differences in fieldwork effects in general (e.g., Nicoletti and Buck 2004) and particularly regarding incentives (e.g., Mutti et al. 2014) .
Large-scale, face-to-face surveys in Germany constitute a critical test of incentive effect theories, as response rates are very low in Germany compared with international standards (Stoop et al. 2010) . Independent of Germany's low response rate, Singer et al. (1999) found lower incentive effects in faceto-face surveys.
1 A replication in these surveys in Germany could confirm the 1. Although Singer et al. (1999) found higher incentive effects for lower response rates, the reanalysis by Gelman, Stevens, and Chan (2003) showed that these effects might have followed from the sample of experiments. The average response rate without incentives was approximately 60 percent. An inherently nonlinear relationship exists between response propensities and response rates. Thus, the incentive effects on response rates could be smaller for experiments with response rates of more than 60 percent than for experiments with response rates of less than 60 percent, even if the incentive effect on response propensity is constant for all response rates. Therefore, because response rates in Germany are much lower than in the United States (as depicted in table 2), incentive effects on response rates might be smaller than in the United States. The combination of expected smaller incentive effects in face-to-face surveys in general and the expected smaller incentive effects in Germany in particular justifies the presented experimental data as a critical case.
theories regarding incentive effects. A replication in these surveys could also strengthen the legitimacy of using incentives in large-scale, face-to-face surveys, which has been scrutinized not only in Germany but also recently in the United States (Marketing Research Association 2015; Fienberg 2013; Pierson 2013) . We examine the effects of incentives across 10 experiments implemented in the following eight German surveys: (1) the "German General Social Survey" (ALLBUS) (Koch and Wasmer 2004) ; (2) the "German Internet Panel" (GIP) (Blom, Gathmann, and Krieger forthcoming) ; (3) the adult panel of the "National Educational Panel Study" (NEPS) (Allmendinger et al. 2011) ; (4) the German Family Panel (pairfam) (Huinink et al. 2011 ); (5) the panel study "Labor Market and Social Security" (PASS) (Trappmann et al. 2010) ; (6) the German implementation of the "Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies" (PIAAC) (Rammstedt 2013 ); (7) the German section of the "Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement" (SHARE) (Börsch-Supan and Jürges 2005); and (8) the "Socio-Economic Panel" (SOEP) (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007) . To examine incentive effects on response rates and nonresponse bias, we observe the response rates for the cross-sectional surveys and the first waves of the panel surveys, unless noted otherwise. Additionally, we consider differences in the distributions of specific socio-demographic variables across experimental groups. We investigate the following three aspects of incentives: (1) the specific incentive form, that is, cash compared with nonmonetary incentives; (2) the monetary value of the incentive; and (3) prepaid, compared with conditional, incentives.
The remainder of this paper begins with a review of the literature regarding incentive effects. Next, we describe the incentive practices in the surveys listed above, the examined experiments, and our analytical approach. Subsequently, we present the experimental results. Finally, we summarize the results and discuss further research directions.
State of the Literature and Hypotheses

INTERNATIONAL RESULTS CONCERNING INCENTIVE EFFECTS
For cross-sectional surveys, Singer et al. (1999) show, in a review of existing studies, that incentives increase response rates across all survey modes. In addition, they show that this effect increases with the monetary value of the incentive. In contrast, Martin, Abreau, and Winters (2001) and Scherpenzeel and Toepoel (2012) find no significant increase in response rates with increasing incentives. For mail surveys, Church (1993) finds diminishing marginal returns of incentive value on response rates. Prepaid incentives lead to higher response rates than conditional incentives, for face-to-face surveys as well as mail and CATI surveys (see also Singer et al. 1999; Scherpenzeel and Toepoel 2012) . Furthermore, cash incentives have a stronger effect on response propensity than gifts, lottery tickets, or charitable donations (see also Singer et al. 1999; Simmons and Wilmot 2004) . For web surveys, Göritz (2006) finds significant incentive effects on response rates but no effects of specific incentive characteristics.
Fewer experimental studies exist of panel surveys, which indicate similar results (see Laurie and Lynn [2009] for a review). Incentives yield higher response rates (Mack et al. 1998; Castiglioni, Pforr, and Krieger 2008; Zagorsky and Rhoton 2008) . This effect increases with the monetary value of the incentive (Booker, Harding, and Benzeval 2011). Booker, Harding, and Benzeval (2011) also show that prepaid incentives, as well as cash incentives, affect response propensity more strongly than conditional incentives and non-monetary incentives. However, Castiglioni, Pforr, and Krieger (2008) find that conditional incentives lead to higher retention rates than prepaid incentives. Overall, there is "no evidence on the relative effectiveness of possible combinations over waves" (Laurie and Lynn 2009, 209) . There is evidence that incentives positively affect retention rates in later waves, that increased incentives in later waves increase response rates, that lowering incentives in later waves does not reduce retention rates, and that incentives do not affect nonresponse bias (e.g., Goldenberg, McGrath, and Tan 2007; Laurie 2007; Jäckle and Lynn 2008) .
Experimental studies also show that incentives can affect the sample composition. Singer et al. (1999, 225) state that incentives "may induce participation on the part of groups that would otherwise be underrepresented in the survey." That is, incentives can reduce sample selection bias. In their literature review, Simmons and Wilmot (2004) conclude that persons and households with low incomes, low education, and dependent children and young respondents and minority ethnic groups are more susceptible to incentives than other respondents (for theoretical analysis, see also Philipson [1997] ).
INCENTIVES IN GERMANY
As in many industrialized countries, large-scale surveys in Germany suffer from decreasing response rates (e.g., Schnell 1997; Stoop et al. 2010) . In response to this problem, large-scale German surveys have adopted incentive strategies. However, at the same time, there is continuing debate over whether incentives are the best strategy for German surveys. There is also ongoing debate over whether the results in the international literature are applicable to face-to-face surveys in Germany because most of the experimental evidence has come from the United States and the UK. Studies examining incentive effects in Germany have concentrated on mail surveys (e.g., Berger et al. 2009; Stadtmüller 2009; Becker and Mehlkop 2011) or web surveys (e.g., Göritz 2006 Göritz , 2010 . For example, Schupp (2012) recommends that rather than using incentives, surveyors should concentrate on appealing to respondents' sense of civic duty (see also Schnell 2012; Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder 2013) . To our knowledge, incentive effects on German face-to-face surveys have been examined only by Castiglioni, Pforr, and Krieger (2008), Blohm and Koch (2013) , Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder (2013) , and Schröder et al. (2013) , and there has been no attempt to provide a general picture thus far.
HYPOTHESES
The question of cross-national differences in incentive effects has been raised before in the literature. From a theoretical perspective, Groves and Couper (1998) , Hox and de Leeuw (2002) , and Johnson et al. (2002) present reasons for lower response propensities in Germany than in the United States. Following the results of Singer et al. (1999) , incentive effects are higher if response rates are lower; this observation could lead to the hypothesis that the incentive effects in Germany are greater than in the United States. If the results of Singer et al. are neglected, the differences in the mean propensities alone could result in different incentive effects on response rates, even if incentives affect the propensities equally, because the relationship between response propensity and response rate is necessarily nonlinear. Cantor, O'Hare, and O'Connor (2008) note that prepaid incentive effects can depend on differential address availability. In contrast to area-and address-based sampling frames in the United States, sampling frames for large-scale, face-to-face surveys in Germany are drawn mostly from resident registers. Therefore, prepaid incentives are personalized and can be tailored depending on the a priori known household size. Empirically, Mutti et al. (2014) find that in the ITC Four-Country Study, respondents from Australia more often complete the survey without cashing the checks used as prepaid incentives, compared to respondents from Canada and the United States. Additionally, whereas Bosnjak and Tuten (2003) find a positive effect of conditional PayPal incentives on response rates for a US sample, Göritz, Wolff, and Goldstein (2008) find a negative effect on response rates for almost identical incentives in Germany. Overall, this reasoning justifies examining whether incentive effects on response rates and nonresponse bias found in studies in the United States and the UK can be replicated in Germany.
We therefore build on the existing research and comprehensively examine whether the incentive effects found in face-to-face surveys in the United States and the UK and those using various modes also apply to large-scale, face-toface surveys in Germany. Considering the lack of strong theoretical arguments for either a positive or negative difference between Germany and the known studies, we expect to find results similar to those in the international literature. Regarding the effects of incentives on response rates in cross-sectional surveys and in first waves and refreshment samples of panel studies, we expect that (1) incentives increase overall response rates; (2) incentive effects increase with the monetary value offered; (3) cash incentives result in higher response rates than non-monetary incentives; and (4) prepaid incentives have a stronger effect on response rates than conditional incentives.
Considering panel surveys, we expect that (5) an increase in incentives in later waves positively affects response rates in the wave of introduction; (6) continuously offered incentives lead to continuously increased retention rates; and (7) a decrease in incentives in later waves does not decrease retention rates.
Regarding nonresponse bias, we would expect to find socio-economically deprived respondents to be more susceptible to incentives than other respondents. However, because of data restrictions, we can examine only whether incentives affect bias in selected general socio-demographic variables, as described in the Methods section. For cross-sectional samples, we expect that (8) no heterogeneous susceptibility can be found for incentives regarding general socio-demographic variables. For panel studies, we expect that (9) incentives do not affect nonresponse bias in later waves. Table 1 provides general descriptive information concerning the studies under consideration.
Data and Methods
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
2 For large-scale, face-to-face surveys in Germany, the sample design and survey organization are particularly important because they largely determine the fieldwork strategies and thus the nonresponse.
3 All of the surveys considered here are government sponsored and conducted either by the "Infas Institute for Applied Social Sciences" (Infas) or "TNS Infratest Sozialforschung" (Infratest).
2. For all studies, the sponsor and funding agency are identical and displayed in the acknowledgments. The conductors are displayed in table 1. The populations of all studies are shown in table 1. The geographic location is Germany for all studies but the pairfam and the PIAAC pilots. For pairfam the geographic area is the combined area of Bremen, Chemnitz, Mannheim, and Munich. For PIAAC the area is the combined area of the states Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Bayern, Sachsen, and Thüringen. 3. See Smith (1978) and Diekmann (2011) for house effects. See Häder and Gabler (2003) for sample designs in Germany. The origins of the sample frames are shown in table 1. A short description of the ADM procedure can found in Häder and Gabler (2003) . GIP and PASS use a modified version of the ADM procedure, as they create a list of all households in the selected geographical units. Regarding the sample design, the sample for ALLBUS is drawn as a two-stage random person sample from the resident register. Sample units from new states of Germany are oversampled. The sample for GIP is drawn as a three-stage random sample with an area frame of residential units (modified "ADM" procedure). For NEPS, the pilot study sample, which is analyzed in this paper, is a random sample from the unused addresses of the refreshment and augmentation samples of the first NEPS wave. It is drawn as two-stage random samples from the resident register. For pairfam, the pilot study, which is analyzed here, is drawn as a single-stage random sample from the resident register of four cities in Germany. The sample is stratified by the three birth cohorts. The cities are a convenience sample. For PASS, the sample for the first wave consists of two separately drawn subsamples. The first subsample is a two-stage sample of households that receive unemployment benefits, drawn from the recipient register of the Federal Employment Agency. The second subsample is a two-stage random sample of households, drawn from a list of residential units, with stratification by social status. For PIAAC, the sample for the pilot study, which is analyzed here, is a two-stage random sample drawn from the resident register. For SHARE, the sample of the first wave is drawn as a two-stage random sample from the resident register (Klevmarken, Hesselius, and Swensson 2005) . For SOEP, the sample for the first waves in 1984 and all refreshment samples of the general population (e.g., Sample E in 1998 , Sample F in 2000 , Sample H in 2006 , Sample I in 2009 , Sample J in 2011 , and Sample K in 2012 are drawn as two-stage random household samples with an area frame of residential units ("ADM" procedure). Table 1 also indicates the methodological differences among these studies: PIAAC is a cross-sectional survey, whereas ALLBUS is a repeated crosssectional survey. All of the other surveys are panels. Regarding the sampling, GIP and SOEP are area-based household samples, 4 PASS uses a register-based sample and a sample based on a list of residential units, and all of the other studies are register-based samples. The survey mode varies as well: NEPS and PASS use a mixed CAPI/CATI design, and pairfam uses a mixed CAPI/CASI design. SOEP used PAPI as the default mode until the late 1990s and CAPI thereafter, allowing for SAQ in experienced panel households. 5 All of the other studies use a CAPI mode. In GIP, respondents are recruited by CAPI but then are interviewed online for the panel.
We selected this group of surveys for our inquiry because all of these surveys conduct face-to-face interviews, they can be considered large-scale studies with respect to their sample sizes and relevance for the German social science community, and the fieldwork is conducted by a professional survey organization. For comparison, table 2 shows the harmonized response rates of the most recent samples of the cross-sectional surveys and the most recent refreshment samples of the panel surveys.
For the fourth wave of SHARE-Germany, which is the wave considered in this paper, no response rates are available because the fieldwork did not proceed as planned (Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder 2013). The remaining response rates are calculated as RR1 rates, following the definitions of AAPOR (2011). In addition to the incentive experiments analyzed in this paper, the studies could use different incentive strategies, as shown in table 3.
All of the surveys examined in this paper have adopted incentive strategies. The SOEP survey began with lottery coupons in its first wave in 1984. Cash incentives of commemorative coins were first used in ALLBUS 2002. Purecash incentives were adopted in 2009 in NEPS. 6 Currently, most of the studies use conditional cash incentives, rather than other forms of incentives. The monetary value ranges from €5 to €50.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
In the ALLBUS survey of 2010, two experiments were conducted (Wasmer et al. 2012; Blohm and Koch 2013) . The first experiment was implemented during the main fieldwork period of the survey. The pool of addresses was split randomly into 4. Two of the three migrant samples of SOEP are based on person registers. 5. In the SOEP, personal interviews are conducted whenever possible (Hanefeld 1987; Haisken-De New and Frick 2005) . Since 1998, SOEP has been gradually replacing PAPI (personal paper and pencil interviewing) with CAPI (computer-assisted personal interviewing) as the predominant mode of data collection. If respondents in the old samples A though H refuse to participate in the personal interview, the fieldwork organization offers mailed questionnaires as a means of refusal conversion. Hence, some experienced panel households may also use self-administered mailed questionnaires (SAQ). an experimental group of 2,592 addresses and a control group of 3,888 addresses. In the experimental condition, respondents received €10 in cash, conditional on participation and announced in an advance letter, whereas respondents in the control group received no incentive. The second experiment was implemented in a separate address pool and was issued to the field in the second half of the fielding period. Here, the first experimental group of 972 addresses was offered €20 in cash, conditional on participation, and the second experimental group of 972 addresses was offered €10 in cash, conditional on participation. In both conditions, the incentives were announced in an advance letter. To avoid confounding area and interviewer effects with the incentive effect, for both experiments, the treatment conditions were randomly assigned in primary sampling units, and the interviewers worked addresses from both treatment conditions. The interviewers knew the treatment condition of each respondent.
The GIP panel survey conducted an incentive experiment during its recruitment survey in 2012. The gross address sample for the experiment consisted of 3,900 household addresses allocated to interviewers during the first fieldwork phase. The first experimental group of 1,464 households received €5 in prepaid cash, which was mailed with the advance letter. The second experimental group of 2,436 households received €10 in cash, conditional on participation. Here, the incentive was announced in the advance letter. Addresses for which the prior address listing had yielded no name on the doorbell or mailbox were excluded from the experiment and received €10 in cash, conditional on participation. The value of the incentives was chosen such that the overall costs of each incentive condition were approximately equal, assuming a 50 percent response rate (AAPOR RR2). Cases were randomly allocated to the experimental groups. Interviewers worked across both incentive conditions and were informed regarding the condition to which a household belonged.
In the pilot study of NEPS wave 1 in 2009 (Infas 2009 ), the incentive amount varied experimentally. The gross sample of the pilot study was split randomly into two groups. The experimental group (N = 861) received €10, conditional on participation, whereas the control group (N = 908) received no incentive. At the end of the field period after only four weeks, only 190 interviews were realized; thus, the response rate was low overall. Another survey experiment was conducted in the pretest study of pairfam (Castiglioni, Pforr, and Krieger 2008) . The pretest was conducted in 2005 and was repeated in half-yearly intervals for two more waves. A random sample of 1,664 persons in three birth cohorts was drawn from the resident registers of four German cities. The sample was split into three treatment groups. The first experimental group (N = 576) received a prepaid €10 voucher incentive, the second group (N = 562) received a €10 voucher, conditional on participation, and the control group (N = 526) received no incentive. The assignment was held constant across all three panel waves. The interviewers were blinded to the treatment condition of each sample unit.
7
In the PASS survey, an experiment was implemented in the third wave, fielded in 2009. The sample of households that had participated in at least one of the earlier waves was randomly split into two treatment groups. The first experimental group of 5,349 households was given the same incentives as in the previous wave (see table 3 ): a lottery ticket with a social sponsor worth €5 per person, conditional on participation. For the second experimental group of 5,362 households, the incentives were increased to a prepaid €10 cash incentive per household. For both groups, the incentives were paid at the household level.
In the German field test of PIAAC in 2010, an incentive experiment was conducted (Zabal et al. 2014) . The field-test design was similar to the main study design described in table 1. The target population was the same, but the sampling area was restricted to five federal states. The gross sample was split into three treatment groups. The first experimental group (N = 1,384) was assigned a conditional incentive of €50 in cash, and the second experimental group received (N = 1,391) €25 in cash, conditional on participation. The third experimental group (N = 674) received a commemorative silver coin worth €10 with the emblem of the 2006 World Cup soccer tournament.
The German division of SHARE conducted an incentive experiment in the refreshment sample in the fourth wave in 2010 (Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder 2013). The experiment consisted of four treatment groups. The first experimental group of 750 persons received a prepaid €40 cash incentive, and the second group of 750 persons received a prepaid €20 cash incentive. The third group of 1,375 persons received a prepaid €10 cash incentive, and the control group of 1,025 persons received no incentive. The analysis sample had to be restricted to the 2,241 cases (57.5 percent of 3,900 total) that had been entirely worked by the survey agency. 8 A case was defined as processed if it resulted in an interview, received a hard or soft refusal, or was visited eight 7. The conditional voucher incentive was sent by the field management team after the completed interview, without interference from the interviewer. 8. The gross sample consisted of 3,900 addresses in 156 sample points. Experimental conditions were randomly allocated in sample points. The households were assigned to interviewers in the fourth calendar week of January 2010, and the first interview was conducted in the seventh calendar week, in mid-February 2010 (Malter 2013) . Fieldwork in the refreshment sample was aborted in August 2012 because of interviewer inactivity and slow progress. The agency was advised to focus on the panel sample. Overall, 1,900 cases out of 3,900 (48.7 percent) were contacted at least once (Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder 2013). The severity of selection bias in the contact process is unclear.
times. Because of these restrictions, nonstandard response rates are reported here, defined as the ratio of households with at least one complete interview to the number of processed addresses.
In the SOEP study, two experiments regarding incentive effects were conducted. The first experiment was implemented in the "Innovation Sample," drawn in 2009 (Richter and Schupp 2012; Schröder et al. 2013 ). The outcomes were measured for the 2009 wave and the subsequent 2010 wave. The experiment consisted of four treatment groups with approximately 1,240 households per treatment, all of which received incentives conditional on participation. The first experimental group ("moderate cash") was promised €5 in cash for the household head and €10 in cash for each individual respondent. The second group ("low cash") received €5 in cash for the household head and €5 cash for each individual. The third group could choose between a lottery ticket and the "low cash" incentive. Finally, the control group received the standard SOEP incentive in the form of a lottery ticket for a charity worth €5 for each participating household member. The experimental variation was removed in the following wave in 2010, in which all of the households were promised the "low cash" incentive.
The second SOEP experiment was implemented with the 1,604 households of the ongoing panel samples A-H, based on the gross sample of 2011 ). All of the households were sent the usual charity lottery ticket (value €5) before participation. Additionally, the experimental groups received €5 cash for the household head and €10 cash for each household member, conditional on the participation of each individual respondent in the household.
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS DESIGN
To test our hypotheses, we examine experimental variations in the offered incentives in cross-sectional studies and in first waves, new refreshment samples, and subsequent waves of panel studies. For all of the experiments described above, except the SHARE experiment, we analyze the original contact record data and the respective realized samples. The information for SHARE is taken from Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder (2013) and is reported here for comparison with the other experiments.
9
For the cross-sectional studies and for the first waves and refreshment samples in panel studies, we consider AAPOR RR1 response rates. In addition, for pairfam, PASS, and SOEP, we examine analogously defined retention rates in later panel waves. More specifically, we examine the differences in response and retention rates across experimental groups with the respective χ 2 statistics. For multi-arm experiments, we report differences in comparison with one reference group.
9. The SHARE organization did not provide any further information and referred to the information published by Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder (2013) and Malter and Börsch-Supan (2013) . With the available information, it is impossible to compute a standard AAPOR response or participation rate for the refreshment sample in the fourth wave of SHARE.
Considering the relative nonresponse bias across incentive groups, we compare the distributions of variables across the experimental conditions that are available for all of the surveys. We do not use external data as a reference for the degree of nonresponse bias because the reference populations differ widely across studies. For surveys for which the sampling units and, therefore, the basis of response rates are households, we examine household size, municipality size, and the proportion of households in the eastern states of Germany. If the sampling units are persons, we additionally examine age, gender, and education. The selection criteria for these variables are eligibility and measurement comparability across all of the surveys.
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In the pairfam and PIAAC pretests, because of the restricted samples, the East-West comparisons are not applicable. Additionally, for pairfam, the distributions in municipality size are not comparable because this study was conducted only in large cities. For SHARE, Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder (2013) do not report any information regarding the variables examined here. Therefore, SHARE is excluded from the nonresponse bias analyses (see footnote 9).
For differences in age and household size, we compare the means of the continuous variables with the respective t-statistics. For the categorical variables gender and proportion of households in East Germany, we compare the respective proportions across experimental conditions. For education, we compare across experimental conditions the proportion of respondents with an academic degree that allows for access to tertiary education. Municipality size is derived from the population in the BIK region containing the municipality in which the respondent unit resides (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014) . This information is coded as a categorical variable with the following groups: under 50k, 50k-under 100k, 100k-under 500k, and 500k or greater. We compare the proportions of these categorical variables across experimental conditions and report the respective χ 2 statistics. Because of the heterogeneity in experimental designs, not all of the hypotheses can be tested with all experiments. Table 4 shows the stated hypotheses and the relevant experiments.
The experimental designs in GIP and PASS are problematic given our hypotheses because the monetary value variation is confounded by the conditionality or the cash payment variation. However, with the GIP experiment, we can examine the experimental conditions that lead to a higher response rate and to a smaller effect on nonresponse bias while 10. The wording of the questions and answers is laid out in the online appendix. Regarding filtering and otherwise intentional respondent selection, the response and retention rates in tables 5 and 6 and the differences in tables 7 and 8 are based on the sample of all eligible cases for the respective waves. For tables 7 and 8, units with item nonresponse for those indicators that are not taken from frame information are disregarded. The resulting sample sizes for the analyses of incentive effects are shown in tables 5 and 6. Sampling error is reflected in the reported t and χ 2 statistics. The response and retention rates in tables 5 and 6, and the differences and t and χ 2 statistics in tables 7 and 8, are computed assuming simple random samples. holding costs constant. Furthermore, with the PASS experiment, we can examine whether a relative increase in incentive value in a later panel wave increases response rates. In addition, the experiments in NEPS, pairfam, and PIAAC were conducted in pilot studies. However, the numbers of observations in all of the experimental groups are sufficient for testing our hypotheses.
Results
The experimental variations and the respective response rates for the crosssectional studies, first waves, and refreshment samples in panel studies are shown in table 5.
Supporting hypothesis 1, we find that offering incentives, compared with not offering incentives, significantly increases the response rates in the first ALLBUS experiment and the NEPS and SHARE experiments. In the first wave of pairfam, offering €10 vouchers does not increase response rates significantly. Considering hypothesis 2, we find an increase in response rates with increasing monetary value in the PIAAC and SHARE experiments. The differences in response rates in the second ALLBUS and the "moderate-cash" and "low-cash" groups in the first SOEP experiment are not significant. This result can be interpreted as weak support for hypothesis 2. In agreement with hypothesis 3, the results of the first SOEP experiment (2009) show that the response rate in the "low-cash" group is higher than in the control group. This difference is significant at the 10 percent level. Confirming hypothesis 4, the GIP experiment shows that prepaid incentives lead to significantly higher response rates than conditional incentives. Considering that the monetary value of the prepaid incentive is lower than the value of the conditional incentive, this is strong evidence that prepaid incentives increase response rates. Regarding incentive effects on panel studies, our experiments yield several results. Considering hypothesis 5, the change from a conditional lottery ticket incentive worth €5 to a prepaid €10 cash incentive in a later wave in the PASS experiment significantly increases the response rate in that wave. However, an increase in incentive value in a later wave in the second SOEP experiment does not increase the response rate significantly. Note that the PASS experiment was implemented in the third wave, whereas the second SOEP experiment was introduced in the 28th wave. Considering this difference, our results show that a change in incentives that is expected to increase response rates in cross-sectional surveys also increases response rates in later panel waves. This result can be interpreted as providing some support for hypothesis 5. Table 6 shows the incentive effects on retention rates in subsequent waves in pairfam and in the first SOEP experiment. Regarding hypothesis 6, the pairfam experiment shows that compared with the control group without incentives, offering a conditional €10 voucher across three waves increases the retention rate, conditional on participation in the previous waves 2 and 3. Offering a prepaid €10 voucher significantly increases the retention rate only in the third wave. Considering the incentive effects on the first wave and the effect instability concerning incentive form, these results provide weak support for hypothesis 6. Confirming hypothesis 7, the first SOEP experiment shows that decreasing the "moderate cash" incentive in the first wave to the "low cash" incentive in the second wave does not lead to a decreased retention rate in the second wave, compared with consecutively offering the "low cash" incentive.
In addition to the effects on response and retention rates, the experiments examined whether incentives affect sample composition. Table 7 shows the differences in the socio-demographic variables on the respondent level in the cross-sectional studies and in the first waves and refreshment samples in the panel studies.
The comparisons of variable distributions across experimental conditions show mixed results. The differences in mean age and the proportions of female respondents do not differ significantly across incentive conditions in any of the seven comparisons. The differences in proportions of respondents with access to tertiary education are significantly different only in one comparison group in pairfam (conditional €10 voucher group: 52.6 percent Households without names on address frame were excluded from the experiment. versus control group: 38.5 percent). 11 Considering the household-level variables, we find that the differences in mean household size across 13 experimental groups are significant only for one comparison group in the first SOEP experiment ("choice" group: 2.4 versus "lottery group": 2.2). The distributions across the four municipality size categories differ significantly only in the PASS experiment. Here, prepaid cash incentives work better than the conditional lottery incentives in metropolitan areas (500k or greater, (34.0 versus 30.5 percent) and vice versa in rural areas (under 50k, 20.2 versus 28.1 percent). The proportions of households in East Germany differ significantly in the PASS experiment (lottery: 27.1 percent, cash: 32.2 percent) and in two comparison groups in the first SOEP experiment (21.2 percent for "moderate cash," 20.8 percent for "low cash," and 15.9 percent for "lottery"). Overall, we find that, in some studies, specific groups of respondents are more responsive to incentives than other respondents, but there are no significant differences between the variables examined in multiple studies. These results lend support for hypothesis 8.
Regarding hypothesis 9, table 8 shows the differences in the socio-demographic variables on the respondent level in subsequent waves for pairfam and the first SOEP experiment. Mean age, mean household size, the distribution across the four municipality size categories, and the proportion of respondents in East Germany do not differ significantly across the examined experimental contrasts. However, in pairfam, the proportions of female respondents differ significantly across both contrasts with respect to the control group in both subsequent waves (W2: conditional 54.9 percent, prepaid 56.1 percent, control 49.3 percent; W3: conditional 58.2 percent, prepaid 59.2 percent, control 46.1 percent). Furthermore, the proportions of respondents with access to tertiary education differ significantly for one contrast in both subsequent pairfam waves (W2: conditional 47.1 percent versus control 66.0 percent; W3: conditional 44.6 percent versus control 65.8 percent). We interpret these results as weak evidence against hypothesis 9 because the significant differences in gender and education were found in both subsequent waves in pairfam. Because this experiment is designed as a pretest, conducted only in four cities with a restricted population, the transferability to general population surveys is limited.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results partly confirm our hypotheses regarding the effects of incentives on response rates and retention rates in large-scale, face-to-face surveys in Germany. Incentives increase response rates. We find weak support for an 11. This result seems to contradict the literature, which shows that socio-economically deprived respondents are more susceptible to incentives. increase in incentive effects with monetary value. Cash incentives have a stronger positive effect on response rates than lottery tickets. Assuming an RR2 response rate of 50 percent, prepaid incentives increase response rates more cost-efficiently than conditional incentives. However, earlier research has indicated that prepaid incentives can cause distrust with some respondents (Börsch-Supan, Krieger, and Schröder 2013). Moreover, we examine the incentive effects in panel studies from a longitudinal perspective. A later rise in incentive value increases response rates in the wave of implementation. We find weak support for a constant increase in retention rates when incentives are consistently offered across multiple waves. Decreasing incentives in a later wave does not decrease retention rates. In addition to the effects of incentives on response rates, the experiments provide information concerning the effects on nonresponse bias. For crosssectional samples, our results indicate that incentives do not differentially affect nonresponse bias regarding the socio-demographic variables considered here. Regarding the influence on nonresponse bias in subsequent waves in panel surveys, we find mixed results. From a conservative perspective, we found in some studies that specific respondent groups are more responsive to incentives than other respondents. Further research is necessary to assess whether incentives improve or aggravate nonresponse bias beyond key sociodemographic variables.
As our study focuses on specific incentive effects on nonresponse, attrition, and nonresponse bias in Germany, we had to put several otherwise interesting aspects in the rear. First, the scope of our study did not permit an investigation of specific incentive effects on mail, telephone, or web surveys. Second, some experiments permit only limited inferences because multiple variations are confounded. Third, our focus on differences between monetary incentives and lottery tickets ignored how symbolic in-kind incentives affect response rates and nonresponse bias. Fourth, we might have overlooked incentive effects on nonresponse bias concerning other variables in addition to those examined here. In addition, our method of analysis does not allow us to infer whether incentives reduce or increase nonresponse bias. Fifth, we ignore incentive effects on measurement error and item nonresponse, which can lead to biased sample distributions. Sixth, our results provide no evidence of whether incentives are cost efficient because alternative methods for increasing response rates and for affecting nonresponse bias are not examined in this paper. Future research should address these issues in greater detail.
The results show that from a cross-sectional perspective, incentive effects in general and the effects of cash and prepayment in particular also apply in Germany. From a panel perspective, the effects of incentives in later panel waves on response rates and the stability of retention rates after decreased incentives can also be transferred to Germany. Therefore, findings in the international literature regarding incentive effects are at least partly generalizable to Germany. However, with our data, the greater incentive susceptibility of socio-economically deprived respondents can be neither confirmed nor rejected for Germany.
